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DIVISION OF LABOR: THE MODERNIZATION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND
CONCOMITANT WORKLOAD REDUCTION
MEASURES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Kyle G.A. Wallace, Andrew J. Tuck, and Max Marks,
Alston & Bird LLP*
ABSTRACT
This article addresses two distinct yet interrelated topics: the arcane
and unnecessarily complex jurisdictional division between the Georgia
Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals, and the excessive
caseload at the Georgia Court of Appeals. The topics relate to one
another because, as will be seen, any attempt to clarify the
jurisdictional division of labor between these courts, and convert the
Supreme Court into more exclusively a court of last resort, will
necessarily increase the caseload at the already-overworked Court of
Appeals. Consequently, any amendment to appellate jurisdiction in
Georgia requires concomitant measures to reduce the per judge
caseload at the Court of Appeals. In Part I.A., this article discusses
Georgia’s appellate system—its history, the jurisdictional division that
arose, the confusion the current jurisdictional framework creates, and
the limitations and burdens it places on Georgia’s highest court. In Part
I.B., the article discusses the current caseload at the Court of Appeals
and the burden any jurisdictional reforms would have on the Court of
Appeals. In Part II, the article presents a new clear jurisdictional
framework for the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of
Appeals, and at the same time, offers cost-effective solutions to ease
the burden at the Court of Appeals, so that these jurisdictional changes
can be implemented.

* The authors are all attorneys at Alston & Bird, LLP, and members of its litigation and trial practice
group. Mr. Wallace is a partner with the firm, Mr. Tuck is a senior associate, and Mr. Marks is an associate.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Georgia’s Appellate System
1. Brief History
Georgia’s early history is marked by “apparent hostility . . . toward
appellate courts in general.”1 For its first seventy years of existence,
Georgia did not have any appellate courts at all, and Georgia’s courts
have grown slowly since that time.2 In 1845, after extensive legislative
debate about the unchecked power of superior court judges, the
Supreme Court of Georgia was created and staffed with three Justices,
making Georgia the last state then in existence to create an appellate
court system.3 As the only appellate court in the state, the Supreme
Court’s primary role was “the correction of errors in judgments
rendered in the superior courts of this state.”4 Because the Supreme
Court had jurisdiction over all appeals, as Georgia steadily grew, the
court’s workload increased. 5 By 1894, “the workload of the court
became so heavy that Chief Justice Logan Bleckley
resigned . . . because he was physically exhausted.”6
The Georgia legislature addressed the Supreme Court’s overload in
two ways. First, the legislature voted to expand the Supreme Court
from three Justices to six in 1895 (the court would reach its current
size of seven in 1945).7 Second, the legislature created a three member
Court of Appeals in 1907 “[t]o further relieve the increasing workload
of the Supreme Court.”8 As originally conceived, the Court of Appeals
was “designated a court of final jurisdiction.”9 Though the Court of
1. The Supreme Court of Georgia: A History, SUPREME COURT OF GA., http://www.gasupreme.us/
history/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
2. See History of the Court of Appeals, GA. COURT OF APPEALS, http://www.gaappeals.us/history/
index.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
3. Id.
4. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 91 S.E. 873, 873 (Ga. 1917).
5. THOMAS S. CHAMBLESS ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE APPELLATE COURTS OF
GEORGIA 2 (Dec. 1996) (on file with the Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2.
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Appeals could itself certify questions to the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court did not have certiorari jurisdiction.10 Consequently, the
Supreme Court could not review any decisions of the Court of Appeals
and could only decide cases that fell within the Court of Appeals’
direct appellate jurisdiction if the Court of Appeals asked for guidance
by certifying a question to the Supreme Court. 11 For practical
purposes, during this time the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
were parallel courts of last resort depending on which court had
jurisdiction over the appeal.12
In 1916, the Georgia legislature doubled the size of the Court of
Appeals to six, and Georgia’s Constitution was amended to
redistribute jurisdiction between the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court in two ways. 13 First, the direct appellate jurisdiction of each
court was modified to be based on the subject matter of the case rather
than the lower court from which the case was appealed.14 The subject
matter-based jurisdictional division in the 1916 Constitution is
essentially the same as the jurisdictional split under today’s
Constitution.15 Second, the 1916 Constitution gave the Supreme Court
certiorari jurisdiction over all cases within the Court of Appeals’ direct
appellate jurisdiction, making the Supreme Court a true court of last
resort sitting in review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, while at
the same time retaining considerable direct review jurisdiction.16
As Georgia continued to grow, the Court of Appeals—bearing a
majority of the direct appeal jurisdiction with only six judges—began
to experience strain.17 The Georgia legislature dealt with this problem
primarily by increasing the number of judges.18 In the early 1960s, the
Court of Appeals grew to seven in 1960 and then to nine in 1961.19 In
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
14. History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2.
15. CHRISTOPHER J. MCFADDEN ET AL., GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 1:3, at 9
(2012–2013 ed. 2013).
16. Id.
17. See CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the late 1990s, the Court of Appeals expanded again, first growing to
ten in 1996, then reaching its present size of twelve in 1999.20 This
history of “intermittent increases in judgeships” on the Court of
Appeals from its creation with three judges in 1907 to the increase to
nine judges in 1961 roughly kept pace with Georgia’s population
growth.21 As shown by the table below, Georgia’s population has more
than doubled since 1961, yet the State has added only three judges to
the Court of Appeals.
Table 1—Population and Judges Over Time
Date

Ga. S.Ct.
Justices

1835
1845
1895
1907
1916
1945
1960
1961
1996
1999
2012

0
3
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7

Ga.
App.
Judges
0
0
0
3
6
6
7
9
10
12
12

Total
Appellate
Judges
0
3
6
9
12
13
14
16
17
19
19

Population*

604,108
798,789
2,026,842
2,505,000
2,856,000
3,119,000
3,949,000
4,015,000
7,501,000
8,046,000
9,920,000

Population/
Appellate
Judge
N/A
266,263
337,807
278,333
238,000
239,932
282,071
250,937
441,235
423,474
522,105

* Population figures are approximate based on census data. For
instance, the figure for 1895 is the average of 1890 and 1900 census
data. Data for years after 1900—also based on census data—was
pulled from https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1
uo9ude_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=populatio
n&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=state:13000&ifdi
m=country&hl=en&dl=en&ind=false.
20. Richard W. Creswell, Georgia Courts in the 21st Century: The Report of the Supreme Court of
Georgia Blue Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1, 11 (2001).
21. Id.
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2. Structure and Jurisdictional Division
Under Georgia’s Constitution, the Supreme Court has a dual role.
First, the Supreme Court retains its historical role as an errorcorrecting court by exercising direct appellate jurisdiction over certain
classes of cases.22 Second, the court has the familiar modern role as a
court of last resort and carries the “ultimate responsibility for
maintaining uniformity and coherence in [Georgia’s] legal doctrine.”23
The court acts as a single body in presiding over its cases. The Georgia
Constitution requires a majority of Justices present to hear each case.24
While the maximum number of Justices is capped at nine by the
Constitution, there has been no substantial push to increase the size of
the Supreme Court beyond seven.25
The Supreme Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction covers ten
different subject areas. Under Article VI, Section 6, Paragraph 2 of the
Georgia Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over: “(1) All cases involving the construction of a treaty
or of the Constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States
and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or
constitutional provision has been drawn in question; and (2) [a]ll cases
of election contest.” 26 In addition, unless the Georgia legislature
provides otherwise (and it has not), the Supreme Court has direct (or
“general”) appellate jurisdiction over:
(1) Cases involving title to land; (2) All equity cases; (3) All cases
involving wills; (4) All habeas corpus cases; (5) All cases
involving extraordinary remedies; (6) All divorce and alimony
cases; (7) All cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals; and (8)
All cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be
imposed.27

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 13.
Id.
GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1.
Id.
Id. at para. 2.
Id. at para. 3.
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In addition to its areas of direct appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court “review[s] by certiorari cases [from] the Court of Appeals which
are of gravity or great public importance.”28 Lastly, the Supreme Court
has the “jurisdiction to answer any question of law from any state
appellate or federal district or appellate court.”29
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over “all cases not reserved
to the Supreme Court or conferred on other courts by law.”30 The Court
of Appeals “sit[s] in panels of not less than three Judges.”31 If any
judge on the three-judge panel dissents, the case must be decided by a
seven-judge panel consisting of the panel to which the case was
assigned, the next three-judge panel in line in rotation, and an
additional seventh judge.32 The seven-judge panel does not hear oral
argument, but may review the transcript of any argument that occurred
before the original panel. 33 There is no constitutional limit on the
maximum number of judges who can serve on the Court of Appeals.34
Unless the subject matter of a case is governed by Georgia’s
discretionary appeals statute, both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals must hear appeals of final judgments and other directly
appealable rulings that fall within their respective subject matter
jurisdictions.35
Under Georgia’s discretionary appeal statute, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35,
the parties must apply for discretionary appellate review for certain
classes of fact-intensive, routine, or low-stakes cases. 36 This
28. Id. at para. 5.
29. Id. at para. 4. The Supreme Court also has the jurisdiction to answer certified questions from the
Court of Appeals. Id. at § 5, para. 4 (“The Court of Appeals may certify a question to the Supreme Court
for instruction, to which it shall then be bound.”).
30. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 3.
31. Id. at para. 2.
32. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c)(1) (2012).
33. § 15-3-1(c)(3).
34. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 1.
35. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) (2013). In addition to final judgments, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) lists several
other rulings that are directly appealable as a matter of right, including: grants or denials of applications
for interlocutory injunctions or final injunctions; mandamus or any other extraordinary remedy, except
for temporary restraining orders; and judgments and orders sustaining the dismissal of a caveat to the
probate of a will. All these examples would go directly to the Supreme Court by virtue of its jurisdiction
over “[a]ll cases involving wills” and “[a]ll cases involving extraordinary remedies.” GA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 6, para. 3(3), (5).
36. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (2012).
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discretionary procedure was originally adopted by statute in 1979 “to
ameliorate the appellate courts’ massive case loads[,]”37 serving as the
major workload reform in the Georgia appellate courts between the
1961 addition of three judges to the Court of Appeals (bringing the
total from six to nine), and the increase of three additional judges in
the late 1990s (bringing the court to its current twelve).38 O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35 makes twelve categories of appeals discretionary including
cases involving $10,000 or less, divorce, alimony, other domestic
relations cases, denials of petitions for habeas corpus, grants or denials
of temporary restraining orders, revocations of probation, grants or
denials of petitions for release, terminations of parental rights, distress
and dispossessory warrants involving only rent due of $2,500 or less,
garnishments, and O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 attorneys’ fees awards. 39
Additionally, only discretionary appeals are taken from decisions of
superior courts acting in a review capacity over state and local boards
and administrative agencies (e.g., State Board of Workers’
Compensation) and lower courts (e.g., magistrate courts), with limited
exceptions as set forth in the statute. 40 Of course, the same
jurisdictional divide applies to discretionary appeals as well, creating
somewhat of a counterintuitive situation where certain cases deemed
insignificant enough to deny appeal as a matter of right will
nevertheless fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Some prominent examples include divorce and alimony cases,
as well as petitions for habeas corpus. As a result, the Supreme Court
decides more discretionary applications per judge than the Court of
Appeals.41 The Supreme Court decides around 600–700 discretionary
applications each year, not far behind the approximately 850 decided
by the Court of Appeals.42
In addition, the courts must hear direct interlocutory appeals of trial
court decisions granting summary judgment, even in part, unless the
37. Scruggs v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 408 S.E.2d 103, 104 (Ga. 1991).
38. Id.
39. § 5-6-35.
40. Id.
41. See infra Table 5—Approximate Potential Increase in Applications for Discretionary Appellate
Review.
42. Id.
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case is governed by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.43 The courts must also hear
interlocutory appeals of orders certifying or refusing to certify a class
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23. 44 The courts also have the
discretionary authority to review other interlocutory decisions upon
application where a trial judge has certified “that the order, decision,
or judgment is of such importance to the case that immediate review
should be had.”45
B. Georgia’s Overworked Court of Appeals
1. 1996 Report of the Commission on the Appellate Courts of
Georgia
In 1996, after a request was made for the addition of four judges to
the Georgia Court of Appeals, Georgia’s General Assembly added one
judge and created the Commission on the Appellate Courts of
Georgia.46 The Commission was tasked with “undertaking a study of
the current structure and operations of the appellate courts of the State
of Georgia with the goal of determining what changes, if any, should
be recommended in such structure and operations in order to” meet six
specific goals, including (1) ensuring “a high quality of appellate
review of trial court decisions where such review is required or
appropriate” and (2) facilitating “the development of an organized and
consistent body of appellate decisions for the guidance of the bench,
the bar, and the general public.” 47 Its membership included state
legislators, judges, the state bar president, and a practicing attorney.48
The Commission determined “that the most immediate problem”
facing Georgia’s appellate court system “is the caseload of the Court
of Appeals.” 49 The Commission observed that there are “two
approaches” to address this problem: “(1) more judges, or (2) fewer
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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appeals, either by shifting jurisdiction to other courts or reducing the
right to appellate review.”50 In addition to simply hiring more judges,
the Commission considered ten potential options aimed at reducing the
court’s workload through structural changes:
1) The clarification or redefinition of the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Georgia and the Court of Appeals, either
through enactment of legislation or amendment of the
Constitution;
2) The creation of new district courts of appeal or the division of
the current Court of Appeals into a Court of Civil Appeals and a
Court of Criminal Appeals, with additional judges;
3) The creation of an appellate division of the superior courts
staffed by superior court judges, senior judges, and other judges
willing to serve voluntarily on such cases with adequate staff,
offices, state funding, and compensation;
4) The shifting of workers’ compensation cases from the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court;
5) The elimination of one level of appeal in workers’
compensation, which now can go through four levels of appeal at
great cost and delay and with infrequent reversal;
6) An increase in monetary amounts covered by the discretionary
appeal procedure of Code Section 5-6-35 of the O.C.G.A.;
7) The establishment of a court with jurisdiction to hear appeals
in matters involving family law, including divorce, child custody,
support, and juvenile matters, or the consolidation of these appeals
into the same court;
8) The consolidation of appeals in cases in which a sentence of
life imprisonment or the death sentence is or could be imposed
into the same court;
9) Making appeals in misdemeanor cases discretionary rather than
direct appeals, making appeals of one or more types of
misdemeanors discretionary, or making appeals in traffic cases
discretionary; and
50. Id. at 4.
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10) Abolishing the right to an interlocutory appeal from the partial
grant of summary judgment.51

The Commission did not recommend any of these options,
concluding that “[a] suggestion for significant jurisdictional changes
is an important decision which, if to be recommended, should be
undertaken only after very careful further study.”52 Highlighting the
competing tensions between the two basic ways to reduce the Court of
Appeals’ caseload—hiring more judges or reducing the number of
appeals—the Commission noted both that “[i]t is difficult to reach a
decision which reduces the access of Georgia’s citizens to their
courts[,]” and that “[t]he costs of each proposal must [] be studied.”53
Ultimately, the Commission recommended the immediate addition
of a new panel of three Court of Appeals judges and the establishment
of a new commission to develop
a plan to modernize and improve the appellate court system . . . .
This plan should include the possible revision of jurisdiction
between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the possible
future addition of judges to the Court of Appeals, and the possible
creation of an appellate division of the superior courts. The goal
should be to have in place by the year 2000 a streamlined, modern,
and efficient appellate court system in which jurisdictional
division is clear and the appellate courts are given the resources
needed, on a continuing basis, to render high quality and cost
effective service to the people of Georgia.54

2. 2001 Report of the Supreme Court of Georgia Blue Ribbon
Commission on the Judiciary
In March 1999, the Supreme Court of Georgia created the Blue
Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary.55 The Commission was created
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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“for the express purpose of considering the ‘structure and organization
of the courts as they relate to efficiency and effectiveness in the
dispensation of justice.’” 56 The Commission was led by former
Georgia Supreme Court Justice Hardy Gregory, Jr. and consisted “of
twenty members including current and former judges and justices,
practicing lawyers, and private citizens.”57
In its discussion of Georgia’s appellate system, the Commission
noted the recommendations of the 1996 Commission and the progress
that the state had made toward those goals by adding three Court of
Appeals judges.58 Though the Commission generally agreed with the
1996 Commission’s basic recommendations, the Commission did not
substantively discuss any of the major structural changes suggested by
the 1996 Commission.59
Instead, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended the following
changes to Georgia’s appellate system: (1) increasing the size of the
court of appeals “in the future as may become necessary to
accommodate its caseload[,]” and (2) reassigning direct appellate
jurisdiction for divorce and equity cases from the Supreme Court to
the Court of Appeals. 60 As the report itself suggests, both of these
recommendations are modest. 61 With regard to the first
recommendation, the Blue Ribbon Commission acknowledged that
“[t]he work of deciding appeals in both of Georgia’s appellate courts
has increased dramatically due to the effects of several forces” related
to population growth. 62 As a result, Georgia’s “supreme court and
court of appeals [are] described as carrying a caseload burden per
judge that is among the highest in the United States.”63 Despite these
observations, the Commission did not recommend an immediate
expansion of judgeships from the twelve approved in 1999.64 Instead,
56. Id. (quoting the 1999 Georgia Supreme Court Order establishing the Blue Ribbon Commission on
the Judiciary).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 11, 13.
59. See id. at 11–14.
60. Id. at 10–11.
61. See Creswell, supra note 20, at 11, 14.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 11–14.
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the Commission noted that “[t]here is no doubt that the latest increase
in the size of the court of appeals will not be the last as the forces
producing more lawsuits and more appeals continue to transform our
state.”65
Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Commission report recommendation
regarding the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was restrained. The
Commission acknowledged the “national movement against by-pass
appeals directly to the court of last resort in states having intermediate
appellate courts[,]” the American Bar Association’s recommendation
that state supreme courts “exercise only discretionary review[,]” and
the recommendations of previous Georgia commissions to limit the
direct appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to “cases on writs of
certiorari, certified cases from state and federal appellate courts,
constitutional cases, election contests, death penalty cases, habeas
cases and extraordinary writs.”66 Despite this movement against direct
appeals to the Supreme Court, the Commission “recommend[ed] an
incremental step in the direction of narrowing the supreme court’s
jurisdiction”—eliminating the supreme court’s equity and divorce
jurisdiction.67 Shifting these two types of appeals from the Supreme
Court to the Court of Appeals is a conservative and incremental
emphasis of the Court of Appeals’ role in the correction of errors and
of the Supreme Court’s responsibility for the coherence and integrity
of legal doctrine and the legal process.68
These modest recommendations were consistent with the Blue
Ribbon Commission’s ultimate conclusion “that the judicial needs of
Georgians are being well served.”69 “While each recommendation of
the Commission is submitted in the belief that its implementation will
result in the incremental enhancement of our judicial system, the
Commission has concluded that there is no need for sweeping revision
of the structures and processes of our courts.”70 Since the Blue Ribbon
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Published by Reading Room, 2014

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13–14.
Creswell, supra note 20, at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 39.
Id.

13

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2

938

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

Commission report was published, the Georgia legislature has not
increased the number of court of appeals judgeships or modified the
direct appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.71
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
A. Problems From 1996 Still Exist
Although the Blue Ribbon Commission’s report struck a largely
positive tone, the problems identified by the 1996 Commission’s
report still exist. 72 Despite some modest improvements, Georgia’s
appellate courts continue to be some of the busiest in the nation, and
the anachronistic jurisdictional split continues to create unnecessary
tension and confusion within the appellate system.73
1. The Georgia Court of Appeals Continues to be one of the
Busiest Intermediate Appellate Courts in the Nation
As shown by the statistical tables below, 74 the workload of the
Georgia Court of Appeals has improved since the 1996 Commission
published its report. Despite Georgia’s rapid population growth,
annual filings in both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
have held remarkably steady from 1992 to 2012. The steady number
of filings during this time period and the addition of three new judges
on the Court of Appeals have combined to appreciably reduce the
number of opinions each Court of Appeals judge must write every
year. But there is still work to be done. Even with these improvements,
“both Georgia appellate courts regularly remain in the top four state
supreme and intermediate appellate courts in opinion load.”75
Furthermore, the changes to the direct appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court discussed in this article will necessarily increase the
71. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:5, at 20.
72. See generally id. § 1:6, 1:7 (discussing the structural problems of Georgia’s appellate courts).
73. Id.
74. The statistical tables in this section present the total number of cases filed in and decisions written
by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals from 1992 through 2012, including per-judge filings and
written decisions.
75. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:7, at 25–26, app. 1.
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workload of the Court of Appeals. 76 For instance, in 2011,
approximately 1,500 of the 2,107 filings in the Georgia Supreme Court
did not first go through the Court of Appeals.77 While most of these
matters did not require a written opinion,78 shifting these filings to the
Court of Appeals would increase the total number of filings in the
already-overworked court by over 40%.79 Without an increase in the
number of judges, this increase in the Court of Appeals’ workload may
lead the court to dispose of more cases with non-binding “physical
precedent” opinions, 80 which have been described as “a
counterbalance to [the] institutional and caseload pressures that inhibit
deliberation among the judges of the Georgia Court of Appeals.”81
These pressures are made all the greater—both at the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court—by Georgia’s constitutional mandate that the
Court of Appeals decide all appeals within two court terms (the “twoterm rule”).82 This means that three times a year, at the end of each of
the courts’ three terms, the judges and Justices must scramble to finish
the cases set for the previous term lest they be automatically affirmed
without opinion.83
The statistical tables below collect data published in the 1994–2012
Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the Courts. 84 The
tables show the total annual filings, written opinions, filings per judge,
and opinions per judge for both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from 1992 through 2012.

76. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
77. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT: GEORGIA
COURTS FY 2012 20 (2012).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. In Georgia, decisions in which a member of a three-judge panel concurs in the judgment only is
called “physical precedent” and cannot be cited as binding authority. See, e.g., Muldrow v. State, 744
S.E.2d 413, 418 nn.27 & 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (describing physical precedent rule).
81. James C. Bonner, Jr. et al., “Physical Precedent” Under Court of Appeals Rule 33(a), APP. REV.,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 1, 3.
82. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 2 (“The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall dispose of
every case at the term for which it is entered on the court’s docket for hearing or at the next term.”).
83. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 2:4, at 38–39.
84. The Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts releases annual reports. Annual Reports, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, http://georgiacourts.gov/index.php/researchacaseload/105 (last visited Apr. 5,
2014).
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Table 2—Total Filings and Written Opinions*
Year

Court of
Appeals

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

3,412
3,530
3,911
3,635
3,450
3,513
3,366
3,359
3,434
3,313
3,260
3,444
3,238
3,139
3,303
3,280
3,273
3,260

2010

3,212

2011
2012

3,448
3,464

Opinions
(Published/
(unpublished)
2,065**
2,183**
2,315**
1,860**
1,805**
1,875**
1,899 (1,592/307)
1,920 (1,667/253)
1,877 (1,551/326)
1,858 (1,448/410)
1,803 (1,540/263)
1,782 (1,488/294)
1,765 (1,497/268)
1,581 (1,389/192)
1,596 (1,390/206)
1,624 (1,359/265)
1,533 (1,322/211)
1,644 (1,277/367–
includes Rule 36)85
1,500 (1,070/430–
includes Rule 36)
N/A
1,703 (1,239/464)

Supreme
Court

Written
Opinions

1,784
1,910
1,961
2,080
1,975
2,118
1,899
1,828
1,879
1,856
1,889
1,882
1,976
1,949
2,167
1,877
2,073
1,979

305
344
401
421
404
364
394
402
371
356
356
364
347
400
352
347
391
325

2,036

357

2,107
1,936

314
231

85. Under Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 36, cases may be affirmed without opinion when:
(1) the evidence supports the judgment; (2) no reversible error of law appears and an
opinion would have no precedential value; (3) the judgment of the court below adequately
explains the decision; and/or (4) the issues are controlled adversely to the appellant for the
reasons and authority given in the appellee’s brief . . . Rule 36 cases have no precedential
value.
GA. CT. APP. R. 36; see also MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 21:1, at 643–44.
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* Data taken from the 1994–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia
Administrative Office of the Courts.
** Prior to 1998, the Annual Reports make no distinction between
published and unpublished opinions.
Table 3—Total Filings and Published Opinions Per Judge*
Year

Published
Filings Per Opinions
Opinions Per S.Ct. Justice Per S.Ct.
CoA Judge
Justice
1992
379
229**
255
44
1993
392
243**
273
39
1994
435
257**
280
57
1995
404
207**
297
60
1996
345
181**
282
58
1997
351
188**
303
52
1998
337
159
271
56
1999
280
139
261
57
2000
286
129
268
53
2001
276
121
265
51
2002
272
128
270
51
2003
287
124
269
52
2004
270
125
282
50
2005
262
116
278
57
2006
275
116
310
50
2007
273
113
268
50
2008
273
110
296
56
2009
272
106
283
46
2010
268
89
291
51
2011
287
N/A
301
45
2012
289
103
277
33
* Data taken from the 1994–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia
Administrative Office of the Courts.
** Includes unpublished opinions.
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2. The Jurisdictional Division Between the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals Continues to Create Tension and Confusion
As explained above, the jurisdictional division between the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals has been essentially unchanged
since 1916.86 This historical conception of the respective roles of the
courts is out of line with modern appellate practice, and the subject
matter split in direct appellate jurisdiction continues to cause confusion
in Georgia’s appellate system. 87 The Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals were originally viewed as dual courts of last resort.88 Today,
the “large majority” of the forty states with an intermediate appellate
court “have a supreme court with exclusively or primarily certiorari or
other discretionary jurisdiction, and an intermediate court of appeals
for original appellate jurisdiction in most cases.”89
In its first decision discussing its new certiorari jurisdiction under
the 1916 Constitution, Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Yesbik, the
Supreme Court recognized the tension created by grafting certiorari
review onto an appellate system that historically functioned as dual
courts of last resort.90 The Yesbik Court observed that, under both the
1907 and 1916 Constitutions, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court were:
each final in their respective jurisdictions, but the latter was bound
to follow the decisions of the former . . . . The cleavage of
jurisdiction between the two courts of review was clearly drawn,
and within its jurisdiction the Court of Appeals was designed to
be a court of last resort. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals is not concurrent, but exclusive in the
particular sphere of each . . . .
[The certiorari] provision [in the 1916 Constitution] was
manifestly intended to vest in this court a comprehensive power,
extending to the review of any decision pronounced by the Court
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:3, at 9.
See id. § 1:6, at 21–22.
Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 91 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1917).
MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:6, at 20–21.
Yesbik, 91 S.E. at 874.
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of Appeals; but, when considered in connection with the whole
constitutional scheme of two reviewing courts, and in the light of
the history of the two courts, it is manifest that a careless exercise
of the power would defeat the very purpose of the institution of
the Court of Appeals . . . . This court, therefore, should be chary
of action in respect to certiorari, and should not require by
certiorari any case to be certified from the Court of Appeals for
review and determination unless it involves gravity and
importance.91

In more recent years, the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed
the issues created by Georgia’s jurisdictional division. 92 Most
famously, in Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n, Inc., Presiding Justice
Fletcher’s concurring opinion observed with respect to equity
jurisdiction that the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals:
often spend more time in routine cases deciding which court has
jurisdiction than in deciding which party should win on appeal and
why. The disproportionate amount of time spent on resolving
disputes concerning appellate jurisdiction creates unnecessary
tension between our appellate courts, squanders limited judicial
resources, and ultimately harms society by diverting attention
from the resolution of more important issues.93

To address this issue, Justice Fletcher observed that “[t]his state needs
to move away from its parallel appellate court structure, which is
antiquated, inefficient, and confusing, to a two-tier structure where the
supreme court functions as a court of last resort.”94 Justice Fletcher
advocated adopting the appellate structure described in the American
Bar Association’s Model Judicial Article:
Under this model, the intermediate appellate court serves
91.
92.
93.
94.
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Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n, 524 S.E.2d 464, 469–70 (Ga. 1999) (Fletcher, J., concurring).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
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primarily as a court to correct error in individual cases and the
supreme court functions to interpret and develop case law for
general application. Thus, this division gives the supreme court
the discretion to decide cases involving an issue of first
impression, the subject of conflicting authorities, or a matter of
importance to the general public or the administration of justice.
....
Until our state revises the structure and jurisdiction of our
appellate courts, however, this court and the court of appeals must
continue to struggle with how to define the classes of cases for
which the supreme court has general appellate jurisdiction, of
which equity cases are a small part, and this court must continue
to spend most of its time functioning as a court to correct error
rather than to develop the law.95

In addition to causing confusion, the jurisdictional split creates
institutional tension between the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.96 As discussed in Redfearn, the Supreme Court would best
serve its institutional function by focusing on developing the law.97
And as set forth in the previous section, any reduction in the Supreme
Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction would necessarily increase the
already heavy workload of the Court of Appeals.98 Notably, the 1996
Commission believed that the tension between the interests of the two
courts was significant enough that:
any continuation of this commission or another commission be
restructured so that no current members of the Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals are included as members of the commission.
Current or former members of the appellate courts have valuable
information which should be received and utilized; however,
recommendations that involve choosing between sometimes
competing points of view can be made more easily and effectively
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
See supra Part II.A.1.
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by those with no immediate or direct stake in the appellate
courts.99

To date, the Georgia legislature has made no change to the division
of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
and the problems described by Justice Fletcher in Redfearn persist.100
These problems are front and center in the recent decision, Durham v.
Durham.101 Durham was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which transferred it to the Supreme Court because it involved the
internal affairs of a trust.102 Under the Georgia statute, “‘[t]rusts are
peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction.’” 103 Consequently, at the
trial level, “‘[a]ctions concerning the construction, administration, or
internal affairs of a trust’”104 must be filed in superior court because,
under Georgia’s Constitution, the superior courts have “exclusive
jurisdiction in ‘equity cases.’” 105 Despite the fact that Georgia’s
constitutional and statutory law recognizes the inherently equitable
nature of trusts, the Supreme Court held in a 4–3 decision that the case
did not fall within the Court’s equity jurisdiction, even though it was
in the equitable jurisdiction of the trial court.106
In a dissent, Presiding Justice Hunstein stated that “as a matter of
policy” she “agree[s] with the majority that ‘equity cases’ should go to
the Court of Appeals.” 107 However, in the absence of legislative
changes to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, Justice Hunstein
disapproved of the Supreme Court’s trend toward unilaterally limiting
its direct jurisdiction by adopting narrow interpretations of the Georgia
Constitution’s jurisdictional grant:
In this case, I would retain jurisdiction for two reasons. One, if the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
See generally Durham v. Durham, 728 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 2012).
See generally id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-6(a)–(b)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-6(a)–(b)).
Id. (quoting GA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, para. 1).
Durham, 728 S.E.2d at 629–31.
Id. at 631 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
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term “equity cases” means anything today, then it should include
appeals in express trust cases where the remedies to beneficiaries
are exclusively equitable and the issue on appeal is the legality or
propriety of that equitable relief. Second, if we continue our recent
practice of narrowly defining the issue on appeal, the result will
be the same as in this case—a transfer to the Court of Appeals—
even in subject matter areas that have in the past been exclusively
within our jurisdiction.108

Justice Hunstein’s dissent seems to recognize that the expansive
category of cases that are directly appealed to the Supreme Court has
led to carving out exceptions and the narrow construing of these
categories when what is needed is real reform of the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, as discussed by Justice Fletcher in Redfearn, it is not ideal
for the Supreme Court to spend significantly more time reviewing trial
court decisions for error than it spends stating and clarifying important
points of Georgia law.109 For example, it seems absurd that the highest
court in Georgia must decide whether a trial court correctly determined
that a tattoo parlor suffered “irreparable harm” when a former
employee stole a single tattoo design, simply because the appeal falls
within the court’s equity jurisdiction. 110 While not all of the direct
appeals to the Supreme Court involve petty matters, the overwhelming
majority of the cases that the court disposes of by written decision do
not have the benefit of first going through the Court of Appeals. For
instance, in 2011, only 58 of the 314 cases that the Supreme Court
decided by written opinion came from the Court of Appeals either by
certification or certiorari.111
The most alarming waste created by the archaic jurisdictional split
in Georgia’s appellate system is the time that the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals spend considering which appellate court has
jurisdiction over the appeal to hear it on the merits. This issue often
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 633 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n, 524 S.E.2d 464, 469–70 (Ga. 1999) (Fletcher, J., concurring).
See Owens v. Ink Wizard Tattoos, 533 S.E.2d 722, 723–24 (Ga. 2000).
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., supra note 77, at 20.
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results in transfers from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court,
which sometimes result in transfers back to the Court of Appeals and
split decisions like Redfearn resulting in a tremendous waste of
Georgia’s already taxed judicial resources.
B. Time for a New Look at Structural Change
Despite persistent calls to modernize Georgia’s appellate system
from both the judiciary and those who have studied it,112 Georgia’s
legislature has failed to take significant action.113 While the increase
in the size of the Court of Appeals to twelve following publication of
the 1996 Report addressed the immediate workload crisis, that reform
effort did not go far enough. Over a decade has passed since the Blue
Ribbon Commission made its “conservative and incremental”
recommendations for modest jurisdictional reforms that would place
proper “emphasis [on] the court of appeals’ role in the correction of
errors and [on] the supreme court’s responsibility for the coherence
and integrity of legal doctrine and the legal process.”114 And yet, no
changes have been made since the Commission issued its report, and
Georgia retains fundamentally the same appellate system that it has
had since 1916.
Georgia is the eighth most populous state in the nation and the center
of commerce in the Southeast,115 yet it continues to operate with an
appellate system that is the product of historical accident rather than
rational thought. Though Georgia’s judges and Justices have done a
commendable job in challenging circumstances, Georgia would
benefit from reforms modernizing its appellate court system. For
example, because Georgia’s Supreme Court must spend the vast

112. See Redfearn, 524 S.E.2d 464, 469–70 (Fletcher, J., concurring); Creswell, supra note 20, at 13;
CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5.
113. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:5, at 20.
114. Creswell, supra note 20, at 14.
115. See Andy Ambrose, Atlanta, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 5, 2014),
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/counties-cities-neighborhoods/atlanta; U.S. Census Bureau,
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013, AM. FACT FINDER,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2013_PEPANN
RES&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
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majority of its time reviewing trial court decisions for error, 116 it
cannot focus on using its role as a certiorari court to ensure a coherent,
reasoned, and uniform body of law for the state. While the great many
who have studied the issue agree that the Supreme Court’s direct
appellate jurisdiction should be significantly reduced, 117 the reality
that any change would further increase the Court of Appeals’ heavy
workload has served as a major roadblock to meaningful change.
It is time for comprehensive change that fulfills the promise of the
Blue Ribbon Commission report and brings our appellate system into
the 21st century.
1. Recommendations for Comprehensive Reform of Georgia’s
Appellate System That Should Occur Now
As previous studies have recognized, meaningful reform of
Georgia’s appellate system must address two interrelated issues: (1)
the jurisdictional split between the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals and (2) the Court of Appeals’ caseload.118 While adopting
either of these changes alone would be an improvement over Georgia’s
current system, Georgia would be best served by simultaneously
adopting both changes as part of a comprehensive reform effort. The
legislature can only resolve the tension between the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals by adopting both changes at once.
Eliminating most of the Supreme Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction
without increasing the size of the Court of Appeals would eliminate
the confusion in the current system, but it would exacerbate the Court
of Appeals’ current workload problems. On the other hand, increasing
the size of the Court of Appeals would reduce the court’s workload
and potentially improve the quality of its opinions, but it would do
nothing to address the fundamental structural problems caused by a
jurisdictional split that survives today as an out-of-place relic of an
earlier era.

116. See supra Part II.A.2.
117. See supra Part I.B.
118. Id.
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a. Converting the Supreme Court of Georgia Into a True
Certiorari Court of Last Resort
First, consistent with the recommendations in the 1996 Report, the
legislature should reform the Supreme Court into a true certiorari court
of last resort retaining direct appellate jurisdiction over only a select
few types of appeals. While the Supreme Court’s direct appellate
jurisdiction over constitutional issues and election contests can only be
modified through a constitutional amendment,119 the legislature can,
and should, eliminate the court’s direct appellate jurisdiction over all
other categories of cases. There is no principled reason for the
Supreme Court to serve as an error-correcting court over the vast
majority of cases that are currently within its jurisdiction—equity
cases, divorce cases, habeas corpus cases, cases involving
extraordinary remedies, cases involving title to land, cases in which
the death penalty was or could have been imposed, and cases involving
the construction of wills. Moving direct appeals of these cases to the
Court of Appeals will resolve the current confusion over the scope of
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and it will allow the Supreme Court
to focus on serving the function that it should serve—creating a
coherent, uniform body of legal precedent in Georgia.
b. The Size of the Court of Appeals Should be Increased to
Address Historical Shortfalls and to Compensate for the Court’s
Expanded Direct Appellate Jurisdiction
Any change in the Supreme Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction
requires a corresponding increase in the size of the Court of Appeals.
It would make no sense to shift direct appellate jurisdiction over
several categories of appeals from the Supreme Court to the Court of
Appeals and not provide a corresponding expansion of the Court of
Appeals to accommodate the change. Any benefit from the
jurisdictional reform would be squandered by placing an additional
unsustainable burden on the Court of Appeals. Due at least in part to

119. Creswell, supra note 20, at 13.
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the Court of Appeals’ heavy workload,120 oral argument occurs in only
a small fraction of the appeals and the court’s members spend less time
conferencing and discussing cases amongst themselves than is typical
in other jurisdictions.121 Increasing the Court of Appeals’ workload
through jurisdictional reform could exacerbate these problems and
lead the court to further rely on unpublished and “physical
precedent”122 decisions. Increasing the size of the court both to offset
the court’s expanded jurisdiction and to remedy historical shortfalls in
judicial capacity would give the judges more time to deliberate, hear
oral arguments, and draft high quality opinions.
Because many of the categories of cases within the Supreme Court’s
direct appellate jurisdiction are subject to discretionary review under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35,123 shifting direct appellate jurisdiction to the Court
of Appeals may only moderately increase the court’s workload as
measured by opinions-per-judge. As shown by the table below, after
subtracting the Supreme Court’s certiorari cases, the number of
opinions that the Supreme Court has written annually from 2005 to
2012 has ranged from 357 to 181. If all of these cases were transferred
to the Court of Appeals, it would result in approximately a 25%
increase in the court’s annual number of published cases. Because the
Supreme Court would retain direct appellate jurisdiction over cases
within its exclusive constitutional jurisdiction, the actual impact on the
Court of Appeals in terms of written opinions would be smaller than
these numbers suggest.
At the same time, the number of applications for discretionary
review filed in the Court of Appeals will increase by over 75%, and
the additional time and resources that the court must spend on these
cases should not be ignored.
As suggested by the tables below, the legislature will need to expand
the Court of Appeals by at least another three-judge panel—a 25%
increase over the size of the current court—in order to handle the

120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra Part I.B.
MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:7, at 26.
See GA. CT. APP. R. 33.
See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (2012).
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increase in workload caused by the proposed changes to the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Table 4—Approximate124 Maximum Potential Increase in Court
of Appeals Opinion Load*
Year125

S.Ct.
Opinions w/o
CoA
Review126

Published
CoA
Opinions

2005
357
1,389
2006
312
1,390
2007
311
1,359
2008
324
1,322
2009
269
1,277
2010
298
1,070
2012
181
1,239
* Data taken from the 2005–2012
Administrative Office of the Courts.

Potential
Percent
Total
Increase
Published
CoA
Opinions
1,746
25.7%
1,702
22.4%
1,670
22.9%
1,646
24.5%
1,546
21.1%
1,368
27.9%
1,420
14.6%
Annual Reports of the Georgia

124. This table overestimates the extent to which the jurisdictional changes discussed in this article
would increase the Court of Appeals’ opinion load. Because the annual reports do not include more
detailed statistics, it is impossible to determine how many of the Supreme Court’s opinions involve the
court’s exclusive constitutional direct appellate jurisdiction. In addition, a small number of the Supreme
Court’s decisions every year answer questions certified by federal courts or the Georgia Court of Appeals.
O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9 (2012); History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2. Consequently, this table assumes
a hypothetical worst-case scenario where all of the Supreme Court’s opinions that do not involve its
certiorari jurisdiction would fall to the Court of Appeals.
125. 2011 is not included in this table because the Court of Appeals has not published a complete data
set.
126. The figures in this column consist of the total number of written opinions published by the
Supreme Court in a given year minus the number of granted petitions for certiorari listed in the “cases
disposed” section of the Annual Reports for the Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts during the
same year. Because it is unlikely that all—or perhaps any—of the writs of certiorari that are granted in a
given year are disposed of by a written opinion the same year, the numbers in this column are not exact.
However, because it is likely that the court eventually writes an opinion regarding most—if not all—of
the cases that it deems important enough to grant a writ of certiorari, the numbers in this table serve as a
reasonable year-to-year approximation of the number of opinions that the Supreme Court writes in cases
where there has not been a Court of Appeals opinion.
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Table 5—Approximate127 Potential Increase in Applications for
Discretionary Appellate Review*
Year

Discretionary Discretionary
Potential
Percent
Applications Applications
Increase
Increase
Considered
Considered Discretionary
by the
by the CoA129 Applications
S.Ct.128
2005
748
786
1,534
95.2%
2006
632
798
1,430
79.2%
2007
605
771
1,376
78.5%
2008
715
830
1,545
86.1%
2009
702
850
1,552
82.6%
2010
670
848
1,581
79.0%
2011
710
876
1,586
81.1%
2012
600
850
1,450
70.6%
* Data taken from the 2005–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia
Administrative Office of the Courts.
There is a recent indication that the Georgia legislature is giving
some thought to these issues. In the 2014 session, a resolution was
introduced for the creation of the “Senate Study Committee on the
Court of Appeals Workload.” 130 The resolution noted that the total
filings in the Court of Appeals in 2012 was 3,404 cases and a “study
is needed to examine the workload of the Court of Appeals to
determine if the composition of the Court of Appeals should be

127. While almost all of the discretionary applications for appellate review currently within the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction will shift to the Court of Appeals if the reforms in this article are
implemented, the Supreme Court would retain jurisdiction for discretionary interlocutory applications that
fall within its exclusive constitutional jurisdiction. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2.
128. The figures in this column include habeas corpus cases, cases covered by the discretionary appeals
statute, discretionary interlocutory appeals, and applications for interim review of pre-trial superior court
orders entered in cases in which the State intends to seek the death penalty.
129. The figures in this column include cases covered by the discretionary appeals statute, applications
for discretionary interlocutory review, and emergency motions filed under Georgia Court of Appeals Rule
40(b).
130. S. Res. 1053, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014).
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increased to include another division of three judges.” 131 The
resolution sought to establish a committee to study “the conditions,
needs, issues, and problems[,]” and “recommend any action or
legislation which the committee deems necessary or appropriate.”132
The resolution was sponsored by Senators Joshua McKoon, 133 Curt
Thompson, Jesse Stone, and Bill Cowsert. While it was favorably
reported out of the Judiciary Committee, it did not pass the Senate prior
to the end of the 2014 legislative session. Fifteen years since the 1999
addition of the twelfth judge to the Court of Appeals,134 perhaps this is
a glimmer of hope that more progress will be made in the 2015 session,
and the Georgia legislature will soon take steps to increase the size of
the Court of Appeals to fifteen judges.135
2. Additional Caseload-Easing Proposals That Should be
Considered
Any effort to reform the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by
shifting appellate jurisdiction over several categories of cases to the
Court of Appeals would require, at a minimum, the addition of three
judges to the Court of Appeals. After thoroughly reviewing the prior
commission reports, analyzing the Georgia appellate courts system,
and conducting numerous interviews of former and current Georgia
appellate judges, legislators, and distinguished law professors, this
much is clear. But this does not mean that adding judges is the only
measure that should be considered for relieving the caseload burden of
the Court of Appeals. There are additional, less expensive reforms that
could also be considered for providing further relief, including several
reviewed or suggested by the 1996 Commission Report. The
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the potential reform
efforts discussed below comes in large part from the authors’ off-the131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Senator McKoon currently serves as the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Senate
Judiciary, GA. STATE SENATE, http://www.senate.ga.gov/committees/en-US/committee.aspx?Committee
=80&Session=23 (last visited July 1, 2014).
134. History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2.
135. The authors applaud the senators for introducing this resolution and giving thought and attention
to this very important issue for our state.
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record interviews with current and former Court of Appeals judges and
Supreme Court Justices.136
a. Amending O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(g) to Allow Use of Current
Superior Court Judges to “Sit by Designation” on Panels of the
Court of Appeals
One potential way to reduce the Court of Appeals’ workload without
significantly increasing costs is to allow current superior court judges
to sit by designation as a third judge on panels along with two of the
current members of the Court of Appeals. 137 Though this measure
would be complex to implement, it has several advantages. Superior
court judges are already on the state’s payroll, they know Georgia law,
and it is likely that at least some superior court judges would appreciate
the opportunity to serve temporarily on the Court of Appeals. In
interviews, former and current judges and Justices reacted strongly to
this proposed reform. While some interviewees thought the idea
should be implemented, others raised objections.
The first and most commonly raised objection was that superior
court judges are busy with their own dockets and many judges may not
have any time to devote to the Court of Appeals.138 This objection is
undoubtedly true, but it can be addressed by creating a voluntary optin program, where superior court judges with some availability and
interest in handling appeals could participate as much or as little as
they see fit. These judges would only need to travel to Atlanta for oral
arguments and could sit as a third judge on non-argument panels that
review appeals once briefing is completed and either recommend the
case for oral argument or decide the case on the briefs. Optimistically,
it is believed that many superior court judges would agree to
participate once a year as a third judge on a dozen non-argument cases
and sit in on a day or two of oral argument. In such a scenario, the

136. Interview notes are on file with the authors. The interviewees declined to be identified for
attribution.
137. Senior appellate judges and superior court judges could also be utilized assuming that it would be
economically feasible to pay for their services.
138. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., supra note 77, at 24.
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superior court judge would likely only be responsible for drafting a
handful of actual opinions.
The second major objection was that the proposed reform would be
administratively infeasible because of limited chambers space and the
logistics of using “outside” judges who may not be familiar with the
internal procedures and norms of the Court of Appeals. It may be too
difficult to effectively handle appeals in which they are involved. One
concern, for example, is that under the current system panels sit
together on all cases for an entire calendar year.139
Like the first objection, the second objection raises legitimate
issues, but they are issues that can be addressed. First, it would not be
necessary to do away with three-judge panels. Instead, the panels could
remain in place with superior court judges added in lieu of one of the
three current panel members for certain cases. An equal distribution of
this substitution would provide caseload relief to the existing members
of the Court of Appeals without undoing the panel assignment system.
Second, superior court judges can draft opinions and review draft
opinions from their own chambers, and the administrative staff and
clerk’s office of the Court of Appeals can continue to handle all
administrative aspects of the appeal. While the superior court judge
would need to understand the timing and process for handling the
appeals, a complete understanding of all the details of the internal
operations of the Court of Appeals would not be necessary. With
respect to the formatting of the opinions, the Court of Appeals’ staff
attorneys would provide assistance as needed.
Any of these same concerns could be suggested about the district
judges who sit by designation on the federal courts of appeals.140 In the
modern age of communication—with reliance on telephone and
email—the administrative issues would not seem to impose a serious
impediment to the use of superior court judges to sit by designation as
a third judge on three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals.

139. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 2; History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2.
140. Alyson M. Palmer, Expect to See More Visiting Judges at 11th Circuit, DAILY REPORT (Jan. 13,
2014), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202637693627.

Published by Reading Room, 2014

31

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2

956

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

This idea borrows aspects of internal operations at the federal circuit
courts of appeal. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has long operated
as one of the busiest regional appellate courts in the federal system,141
but has relieved pressure on its sitting judges by routinely having a
third judge from a district court or different courts of appeal sit on
appellate panels.142 In addition, federal courts of appeal use panels to
separate more easily decided appeals that can be efficiently resolved
without oral argument from more difficult appeals for which oral
argument would be beneficial.143
When caseload overtaxes the capacity of appellate judges to
review personally, to discuss collegially, and to endorse
collectively a written statement of the reasons for decision in each
case on their docket, the imperative to decide is in tension with
other fundamental values of appeal. If mechanisms are not
developed to cope with docket overload, an appellate court cannot
satisfactorily meet its obligation to individual litigants—the
correction of prejudicial trial court error—much less its
institutional obligations to declare precedent and to supervise the
overall administration of justice by the trial courts. But unless
caseload control mechanisms permit adequate participation by the
parties in the proceedings which determine their fate, while
preserving the court-like characteristics that legitimate the
exercise of judicial power, other significant values of appeal are
in jeopardy. The principal caseload control mechanism developed
by the United States courts of appeals and similarly burdened state
appellate courts is the practice of “screening” their dockets to
141. In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit produced 319 written opinions per judge, while the second busiest
court last year produced 243 written opinions, and the national average was 186 written opinions. U.S.
Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/appeals-fcms-profiles-september2013.pdf&page=21 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). This caseload is part of a long-term trend. From 2008 to
2013, the Eleventh Circuit produced an average of 251 opinions per judge, while the national average was
165. Id.
142. In fact, because the Eleventh Circuit has four vacancies, Chief Judge Ed Carnes has declared an
emergency and allowed the use of two visiting judges on three-judge panels. Palmer, supra note 140.
143. John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience in the Eighties and
Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REV. 859, 863 (1991).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/2

32

Wallace et al.: Division of Labor

2014] THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

957

identify cases appropriate for procedural short-cuts.144

Notably, the statutory framework for this use of superior court
judges is already in place. The Georgia Code Section governing
procedures in the Georgia Court of Appeals provides:
Whenever the court unanimously determines that the business of
the court requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge
or additional judges or one additional panel, the court may request
the assistance of senior appellate judges as provided in Chapter
3A of this title or senior superior court judges as provided in Code
Section 47-23-101 [see also O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.2]. The Judge
whose case assignment is transferred to the additional judge shall
not vote on the case.145

This provision could be repurposed to remove its limited application
to senior superior court judges and temporary nature. It could then be
amended to set forth a screening procedure, or screening could be left
to the Court of Appeals to handle through its rules and internal
operating procedures.
While allowing superior court judges to serve by designation on the
Court of Appeals would be a complex reform to implement, it is also
one of the most feasible ways to reduce the court’s workload without
significantly increasing costs. Because district court judges already sit
by designation in the Eleventh Circuit, there is evidence that this
reform can be successfully implemented. Furthermore, because
Georgia already has an existing statutory framework for judges who
sit by designation, it should be straightforward for the legislature to
expand the circumstances in which designation is appropriate. In sum,
further consideration should be given to whether some use of superior
court judges sitting by designation would help reduce the workload of
the Court of Appeals. Even modest relief would be welcomed, and the

144. Id. at 860.
145. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(g) (2012).
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experience gained by the superior court judges would benefit
Georgia’s trial court system.
b. Allowing Dissents in Three-Judge Panels
Unlike other courts sitting in three-judge panels, the Georgia Court
of Appeals does not have two-to-one split decisions.146 If any judge on
a three-judge panel dissents, rather than issuing an opinion, the case is
decided by a seven-judge panel. 147 This requirement, coupled with
pressure created by the two-term rule, has given rise to situations
where a third judge on a three-judge panel will simply concur in the
judgment without joining the opinion or drafting a separate concurring
opinion.148 Under Court of Appeals Rule 33, these opinions that do not
achieve the full panel’s consensus are called physical precedent and
are not binding on future panels. 149 The workload at the Court of
Appeals could be reduced by a simple amendment to O.C.G.A. § 153-1(c) eliminating the automatic seven-judge panel, and yet preserving
the en banc review process:
(1) Each division shall hear and determine, independently of the
others, the cases assigned to it, except that the division next in line
in rotation and a seventh Judge shall participate in the
determination of each case in which there is a dissent in the
division to which the case was originally assigned.
(2) In all cases which involve one or more questions which, in the
146. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs of Jefferson v. Teton Corp., 3 N.E.3d 556, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014);
State v. Sanders, 753 S.E.2d 713, 718 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014); Salvato v. Salvato, 2 N.E.3d 974, 989–90
(Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
147. § 15-3-1(c)(1).
148. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 369 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (Deen, J., concurring dubitante).
149. GA. CT. APP. R. 33.To prevent a considered opinion from becoming physical precedent, Judge
Braswell Deen in the late 1980s revived a practice not widely used at the court since the early twentieth
century by concurring dubitante. Judge Deen “consider[ed] dubitante a weak concurrence, but
nevertheless a full concurrence” which had many “laudable attributes” including making the decision
binding precedent. Floyd, 369 S.E.2d at 318 (Deen, J., concurring dubitante). The concurrence dubitante
has reappeared in the last few years, though by reading the opinions it seems the judges do not consider a
concurrence dubitante a full concurrence. Nalley v. Langdale, 734 S.E.2d 908, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
(Dillard, J., concurring dubitante) (“Unfortunately, our constitutional duty to resolve this appeal today
(within two terms of docketing) precludes me from engaging in the type of extended study necessary to
achieve a high degree of confidence that my experienced, able colleagues are right.”) (footnotes omitted).
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opinion of the majority of the Judges of the division or of the two
divisions plus a seventh Judge to which a case is assigned, should
be passed upon by all the members of the court, the questions may
be presented to all the members of the court; and if a majority of
all the members of the court decide that the question or questions
involved should, in their judgment and discretion, be decided by
all the members of the court, the case shall be passed upon by all
the members of the court, provided that a majority of the Judges
passing upon the case concur in the judgment.150

With the enactment of this reform, it would no longer be mandatory
for a seven-judge panel to decide any case in which there is a dissent.
This would reduce the court’s workload to some extent, and it may
encourage judges to issue written dissents, which could potentially aid
the development of Georgia’s law.
Instead of automatically reviewing cases in which there is a dissent
in seven-judge panels, the Court of Appeals could consider whether to
permit parties to file motions seeking rehearing en banc following a
decision by a panel in addition or in lieu of the traditional motion for
reconsideration. There is currently no means in the Court of Appeals’
rules for a party to seek rehearing en banc or initiate any review of the
decision by other members of the court not involved in the panel’s
decision. 151 Many appellate practitioners in Georgia consider this a
significant shortcoming, and replacing the seven-judge panels for
cases involving a dissent with an opportunity for parties to seek
rehearing en banc would be a significant improvement in the Georgia
appellate system.
c. Appellate Mediation
The Court of Appeals has attempted in the past to create an appellate
mediation program to relieve part of its caseload.152 Meetings were
150. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c) (2012) (suggested amendment added).
151. See GA. CT. APP. R. 37.
152. Details regarding the Georgia Court of Appeals prior attempt at creating a mediation program
came from multiple interviews with former and current Court of Appeals’ judges. The interviewees
declined to be identified for attribution, and interview notes are on file with the authors.
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held with Steve Kinnard, the eponymous mediator from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals mediation center. The mediation program did
not ultimately succeed, with reasons ranging from a lack of enthusiasm
from the bench and bar to the fact that the mediation program was not
mandatory (i.e., the court lacked the power to send appeals to
mediation without the consent of the parties).
In interviews, judges were split on whether it would be worthwhile
to implement an appellate mediation program, but everyone agreed
that it would be necessary to make changes to the prior system. Most
significantly, interviewees uniformly agreed that any mediation
program would need to be mandatory for it to have any chance of
working, and the judges would get to select which cases go to
mediation. Even with a mandatory program, some judges and Justices
were skeptical that an appellate mediation program would work
because, in most cases, one of the parties in mediation would have just
won at the trial level and might not be inclined to negotiate away the
win. Another obstacle is the constitutionally-imposed two-term rule.
Some of the interviewed judges expressed legitimate concern that time
spent on an unsuccessful mediation may leave the court with too little
time to resolve the appeal.
Ultimately, appellate mediation is an idea that merits further
consideration, but it may not be worth implementing. Although the
resolution of even a small number of appeals each year through the
mediation process would likely provide some relief to the Court of
Appeals, the anticipated reduction in workload would need to be
compared to the cost of the mediation program (and the cost of other
alternatives that might be more effective).
d. Subject Matter and Regional Courts of Appeal
Looking at the intermediate appellate court structure of some other
states, the prior commissions included consideration of dividing the
Court of Appeals into a civil court and a criminal court or creating
regional courts of appeal. For instance, Texas partially splits appellate

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/2

36

Wallace et al.: Division of Labor

2014] THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

961

jurisdiction between civil and criminal. 153 Florida splits its
intermediate appellate courts into regional districts of appeal.154
Specialized subject-matter courts necessarily have more specialized
judges than those sitting on the current Georgia Court of Appeals—a
completely generalist institution. By developing more specialized
judges, that follow a more uniform jurisprudence, specialized appellate
courts can create efficiencies in appellate practice.155 Any inefficiency
created by different judges being able only to hear certain types of
appeals (for example, if the civil caseload vastly outstrips the criminal
caseload) can be cured by appropriately redistributing the judgeships
between the two courts as retirements create new judicial openings,
and perhaps even at the end of election cycles for members of the court.
Potential divisions include not only civil and criminal, but also
specialized courts for workers’ compensation or family law.156 At the
same time, there is some concern that having elected judges to a court
who handle only criminal appeals results in candidates battling each
other for the title of “toughest on crime.”157
A second, potentially more complicated, option for decreasing the
caseload of the Georgia Court of Appeals would be to divide the court
into regional circuit courts of appeal. The regional court system would
comprise combinations of Georgia’s forty-nine already existing
superior court circuits. In such a system, the court could still meet in
Atlanta-based sessions for en banc hearings to resolve splits among the
regional circuits. Any amount of regional courts of appeal would
require new courtrooms, courthouses, and administrative personnel.
Moreover, with the concentration of people in metropolitan Atlanta
and the absence of other large population centers in the state, Georgia

153. Texas, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/State_Court_
Structure_Charts/Texas.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
154. Florida, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/State_Court_
Structure_Charts/Florida.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
155. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent
Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 393, 408–09 (2011).
156. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
157. Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal
Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1109–12 (2006).
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is not the same natural fit for regional courts of appeal as other states,
such as Florida.158
In interviews, Georgia’s current and former appellate judges were
uniformly opposed to creating regional courts of appeal or dividing the
Court of Appeals into a civil and criminal division. Though the judges
acknowledged that having one generalized court might be impractical
once the court reaches a certain size, everyone interviewed believed
that the current court is nowhere near that size. The interviewees were
concerned that dividing the court would negatively impact the court’s
culture and working relationships.
In sum, these ideas may warrant further consideration, should the
Georgia Court of Appeals become so large in number to necessitate it
(e.g., increase beyond the fifteen judges proposed in this article). But
splitting the court is not itself a solution for reducing the workload of
the Court of Appeals. As the 1996 Commission put it, it comes down
to more judges or fewer appeals.159
CONCLUSION
Significant change to the Georgia appellate courts will require a far
more detailed study than this article. As the 1996 Commission
suggested, “[a]s an example, the addition of [appellate] divisions to the
superior courts may require more full-time judges, law clerks, support
personnel, office space, library materials, and equipment for those
courts,”160 to highlight some of the logistical complexity. This article
is merely an attempt to amplify the faint echo of the 1996
Commission’s call to develop a plan to modernize Georgia’s courts—
“to have in place . . . a streamlined, modern, and efficient appellate
court system in which jurisdictional division is clear and appellate
courts are given the resources needed, on a continuing basis, to render

158. District Courts of Appeal, FLA. COURTS, http://www.flcourts.org/florida-courts/district-courtappeal.stml (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
159. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
160. Id. at 5.
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high quality and cost effective service to the people of Georgia.”161 For
now, the authors believe that the Georgia legislature should:
1. Increase the size of the Court of Appeals to fifteen judges and also
provide sufficient funding necessary to maintain appropriate
central staffing;
2. Convert the Supreme Court into a true certiorari court by providing
the Georgia Court of Appeals with direct appellate jurisdiction
over (1) cases involving title to land; (2) all equity cases; (3) all
cases involving wills; (4) all habeas corpus cases; (5) all cases
involving extraordinary remedies; (6) all divorce and alimony
cases; and (7) all cases in which the death penalty is or could have
been imposed;
3. Amend O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(g) to give the Court of Appeals the
flexibility to utilize current and former superior court judges to sit
by designation as the court deems appropriate upon further
consideration; and
4. Amend O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c) to abolish the automatic seven-judge
panel rule to relieve an unnecessary workload burden on the Court
of Appeals.

161. Id. at 6.
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